II

INTEREST GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON EDUCATIONAL POLITICS

Working from the structural frameworks of Part I of this Handbook, we now turn to the important behaviors that include the political actors, their interactions and coalitions, the pluralistic behaviors of institutions, the micropolitics of these leaders and the actors who implement policy such as principals and teachers. Behavior, we know, is influenced by role and rank in organizations and by the political culture of the society, Congress, state governments, local institutions, and of course, by school systems themselves. Politics is so important, and prevalent, that it's often invisible as leaders make themselves heard and felt.

Thus, embedded in the federalist structure of schooling in the United States is a whole range of behaviors that are easily recognized as political: voting, lobbying, electing, and organizing to influence the way schools operate. At the other end of the system are the people interested in education as a personal, local, civic, and immediate political activity. What is the political culture of education? How do teachers, students, administrators, and political leaders define their relationships and play out their political roles? What are some of the research tools used by micropolitical analysts, and how might improved understanding of the culture of schools improve educational policymaking?

Pluralism has traditionally represented the political center in the study of American education politics. The pluralist perspective tends to define power as an exchange of desired goods among political actors. It emphasizes the role of contradictions, bargaining, and compromises among competing interests who work within the existing institutional roles and structures such as school boards, state legislatures, Congress, and executive agencies. Pluralism also focuses on political inputs that influence these actors such as interest groups, political parties, and public opinion. This section also includes attention to the political economy of public education, for economic goals and interests are central to pluralist bargaining and to the priorities of many actors who pursue micropolitical goals and interests.

RT61112_C011.indd 193 3/26/2008 5:21:11 PM

11

Politics of Interest: Interest Groups and Advocacy Coalitions in American Education

V. Darleen Opfer, Tamara V. Young, and Lance D. Fusarelli

While institutions play a key role in shaping the policy process and influencing the outcome of that process, many scholars assert that, ultimately, it is people—policy makers, activists, and interest groups—who determine the outcome of political battles over education reform. The influence of organized interest groups remains a central theme in the study of the politics of education. Indeed, many prevailing theories of policy making—pluralism, the iron triangle or subsystems perspective, interest group theory, issue networks, policy communities, policy domains, and advocacy coalition frameworks—consider interest groups to be integral to the policy process in the United States.

The presence of interest groups in educational politics and policy making can no longer be questioned or ignored. Their presence is felt in election campaigns, ballot initiatives, research production, legislative battles, and curricula decisions at all levels. Despite their all-pervading presence, we have very little research specific to educational interest groups. While many articles on the politics of education may mention the involvement of education interest groups as one of many actors in the political activity under investigation, less than 50 articles have been written since 1980 that focus extensively on understanding these groups. Of the articles that have had this focus, more than half appeared in one of two special journal issues on the topic: *Education & Urban Society* (1981) and *Educational Policy* (2001).

In this chapter we hope to inspire more research on interest groups and education groups specifically. To do so, we present the ways in which interest groups have been studied, both conceptually and methodologically, and the issues these studies raise for future research. Given the paucity of scholarship specific to educational interest groups, we must often rely on the research from political science and infer the possible implications for education groups. The research presented in this chapter is organized around addressing three questions that help to illustrate the more substantial conceptual and methodological issues plaguing research on interest groups generally and on educational interest groups specifically:

1. What is an interest group?
2. How do interest groups influence policy?
3. How have interest groups evolved?

RT61112_C011.indd 195 3/26/2008 5:21:14 PM

We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the future of educational interest group research and whether a break with the political science community is necessary, possible, or even desirable for this subfield of the politics of education.

PROLIFERATION OF EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS

Educational interest groups appear to be everywhere. During one week, in August 2006, the following were some of the more than 125 references to educational interest groups that appeared in local and state-level news sources:

> *I have made a public record on the school board, and that record is an indication that no one can dictate their* positions to me and no special interest group can control me. (Roger McDowell, School Board Member, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, quoted by Reuben Mees in *Hattiesburg American*, August 26, 2006)

> An influential state panel recommended Friday that Ohio combine early childhood learning under a single state agency…. The ideas presented by the Schools Readiness Solutions Group were immediately backed by a new lobbying coalition of parents, teachers and business leaders called "Groundwork." (Smyth, *Akron Beacon Journal*, August 25, 2006)

> In an editorial about a K-16 ballot initiative for funding in Michigan, Tricia Kinley of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce was quoted as saying, "Regardless of the costs, we also oppose this money grab because it is bad public policy to allow one special interest group to have its funding put on an auto-pilot mechanism…." (*Dowagiac Daily News*, August 21, 2006)

At the federal level, the amount of interest group activity around educational issues has exploded. According to semiannual lobbying disclosure reports filed with the Secretary of the Senate's Office of Public Records, the number of registered groups lobbying on educational issues rose 55% between 1998 and 2005 (see Figure 11.1 below). Additionally, the amount of money spent on these activities during the same period increased by $50 million (see Figure 11.2 below). As a result of this rise in the numbers of groups involved and the amounts they spend, education was, in 2005, the 10th most active lobbying issue in the capitol (Center for Responsive Politics, 2006).



FIGURE 11.1 Number of registered interest groups lobbying on education issues in Washington, D.C., 1998–2005. *Source:* Figures based on data from Secretary of the U. S. Senate, Office of Public Records.



FIGURE 11.2 Amount spent on lobbying on educational issues by registered interest groups in Washington, D.C. *Source:* Based on data from Secretary of the U. S. Senate, Office of Public Records.

WHAT IS AN INTEREST GROUP?

Because educational interests groups seem so ubiquitous, research on these groups is perhaps most notable for its lack of stated definition of interest groups. Educational researchers have most often assumed that whether they are talking about interest groups (Kirst & Somers, 1981; Mawhinney, 2001; McDaniel, Sims & Miskel, 2001; Opfer, 2001; Sipple, Miskel, Matheney, & Kearney, 1997; Song & Miskel, 2002; Sroufe, 1981; Steele, Working, & Biernacki, 1981), interests (Johnson, 2001), advocacy coalitions (Fusarelli, 1997), political interests (Cibulka, 2001), or cultivated collections of interests (Lugg, 2001) that we know what it is they are talking about. Those educational researchers who have provided a definition of interest groups most often rely on Thomas and Hrebner's inclusive definition (1992) that considers an interest group as "any association of individuals, whether formally organized or not, that attempts to influence public policy" (p. 153; see also McDaniel et al., 2001; Sipple et al., 1997; Song & Miskel, 2002). In discussing the choice of such an inclusive definition by educational researchers, Malen (2001) claimed, "This view may be a particularly appropriate orientation to adopt, given the rapid growth and the diverse character of education-related interest groups" (p. 172). However, the inclusivity of this definition masks three conceptual problems, relating to organization, activity, and distinctiveness from political parties, which have plagued political science researchers who have striven for definitional clarity. These three issues will be considered in this section.

Organizational Ambiguity

A prominent conceptual issue in the political science research on interest groups is whether these groups must be organized; that is, have members and officers. Those who claim that interest groups must have some organizational aspects argue that what sets *interest groups* apart from *interests* is the cooperative promotion of the shared interest. James Yoho (1998) claimed that, "Those who merely share an interest are a 'group' only in the sense that they are not singular" (p. 232).[1] Scholars who take this position on defining interest groups often do so because they are studying interest group systems and the inclusion of unorganized interests makes it virtually impossible to establish parameters for the system and determine which interest groups are present at any given time (e.g., Mahood, 1990; Salisbury, 1975; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986; Wilson, 1981). This definitional imposition of organizational characteristics has, however, excluded from their research corporations that lobby, political action committees, think tanks that advocate policy positions, and law firms that provide lobbying services.

This organizational requirement also contrasts sharply with the ideas set out by some of the founders of interest group research. David B. Truman (1958), with his concept of latent interest groups, recognized that it is from unorganized interests that interest groups often arise. This conceptualization of interest groups which includes unorganized interests is most prominent in the work of scholars concerned with the formation of interest groups such as Jeffrey Berry (1984) and Mancur Olson (1967). Thus, these scholars require the inclusion of latent interests to understand the process of transformation to an organized state (i.e., when it occurs, how it occurs).

Activity Ambiguity

Beyond variation in organization, interest group scholars have also failed clearly to define these groups in ways that differentiate groups by the activity they undertake. For example, Truman (1958) refers to both "interest groups" and "political interest groups" but makes little distinction between the two in regards to the types of activities they engage in. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (1972) also contribute to this confusion, albeit in a different way. In their work on interest groups they include "organization[s] involved in community affairs" that make no attempt to influence government action.

Some of the lack of clarity on the inclusion or exclusion of influence activities, as a requisite for interest group status, may result from an inability to consistently identify organizational purposes (Yoho, 1998). To illustrate potential problems encountered, consider the following scenario. The booster club for a local high school marching band has been in existence since the school was built in 1974. From that time until 2000 their primary purpose was to raise funds for band uniforms and band travel through various fundraising activities. In 2000 the legislature in their state decides to raise significantly the gas tax paid by high occupancy vehicles which includes the buses rented for band trips. This change would increase the cost of band travel by 25%. In response the parents write letters to legislators, hold a public forum on the problem, and get a local reporter to write a story about the impact on the band.. Through their actions, and the actions of other interest groups, the legislation fails. Since then the parents have returned to raising funds for their band and have not engaged in further influence activity. In the thirty-year period of the band boosters they have attempted to influence government once. Are they an interest group? Should we only include them for the period for which they were engaged in influence? What if a similar legislative attempt is made in the next year and this reactivates them? Separating organizational purpose and organizational influence activity appears clearly important to the delineation of an interest group definition but doing so creates other problems for determining organizational onset and demise. And, not including influence as a definitional requirement makes differentiation between interest groups and other organizations problematic.

Distinctional Ambiguity

A third definitional problem that has arisen in the interest group literature is in distinguishing between political parties and interest groups. The activities undertaken by political parties and interest groups have significant overlap. Both advocate specific policy positions, endorse candidates, work to get out the vote, etc. Given this overlap, Edward Malecki (1976) argued that, "The distinction between party and pressure group is not absolute" (p. 400).

Compounding the similarity is the recent practice by both political parties and interest groups to spin-off "satellite groups." For example, on the political party side, the Democratic Leadership Council developed the Third Way Foundation, which funded the Progressive Policy Institute, which then funded an education specific organization, the Education Sector (see www.dlc.org,

www.ppionline.org, and www.educationsector.org). On the interest group side we have recently seen instances of the National Education Association funding other interest groups and think tanks which oppose the No Child Left Behind legislation (Toppo, 2006). Similarly, reports show the United Teachers of Los Angeles funding community groups which support their position on district level reform (Boghossian, 2006). Because the classic distinction between political parties that attempt to influence elections and interest groups that attempt to influence policy no longer remains, Graham Wilson (1981) concluded, "perhaps all that can be done to distinguish political parties from interest groups is to suggest that their ostensible purpose is always narrower than that of political parties" (p. 12).

Interest group researchers who have attempted to demarcate interest groups from political parties have relied on a sole criterion. Kay Schlozman and John Tierney (1986) make a distinction based on a group's ability to *nominate* electoral candidates. Political parties, they reason, could both nominate and endorse candidates whereas interest groups could only endorse those they wished to see elected. While this distinction holds some useful analytical promise in the current U.S. context, it proves more problematic in distinguishing between political parties and interest groups in multiparty political systems where parties are more platform oriented and the nomination of candidates is less consequential. The distinction based on the ability to nominate is also less helpful in regard to U.S. historical literature which often failed to identify groups as either political parties or interests. For example, in the case of James Madison's *Federalist 10,* some have taken his use of the term *faction* to refer to political parties (e.g., Hofstadter, 1969) others to interest groups (e.g., Lowi, 1979), and still others claim the reference could be applied to both (e.g., Truman, 1958). As with the other issues discussed in this section, answers to the question, "What is an interest group?" are not simple or easy.

Implications of Definitional Ambiguity

In an attempt to overcome the conceptual problems of organization, activity, and distinction, Wirt and Kirst (2005) suggest a classification of interest groups that highlights differences among groups. These researchers propose that we consider whether groups have: temporary versus permanent organization, special versus broad interests, and larger versus limited resources. Nownes (2001) however, identifies thirteen major types of organized interests active in the United States today; some of which do not fit within that classification system: corporations, trade associations, labor unions, professional associations, citizen groups, think tanks, domestic governmental entities, churches, foreign governmental entities, universities and colleges, coalitions, charities, and political action committees. Wirt and Kirst (2005) readily admit that their classification schema cannot accommodate issue networks or other collections of interests such as advocacy coalitions and political action committees: "Policy issue networks are in some ways an interest group but do not fit any of the conventional definitions. Policy issue networks can encompass several interest groups, but will focus on a single issue…. In contrast, interest groups are concerned with numerous interrelated issues" (pp. 83–93).

These problems of classification are likely to increase in the near future. Growth in technology multiplies the points of contact for influence resulting in a more diverse interest group universe. In addition to the corporations, research organizations, and unclassified collections of interests, we can add bloggers and Internet social networking sites with embedded political action applications. As we will argue in the last section of this chapter, this increase in individualistic activity without the need for membership and affiliation traditionally associated with interest groups has serious implications for the politics of education and democratic governance more generally.

This continuing growth and diversification of interest groups, the definitional issues raised in existing research, and our inability to develop encompassing classification systems, have implications for the research carried out on educational interest groups. Including unorganized interests makes it difficult to study systems of interest groups, whereas excluding them makes the study of interest group formation problematic. Identifying groups based on their organizational purpose is fraught with difficulties as organizational circumstances change; and yet identifying them based solely on the use of influence tactics creates a constantly revolving cast of interest groups on which to focus. Distinguishing interest groups from political parties is becoming increasingly difficult as both organizations take on properties of the other; and focusing on the one aspect that currently differs in the U.S. context would limit both comparative and historical research on interest groups.

Educational interest group researchers can draw heavily upon the lessons learned by political science scholars who have wrestled with this question of interest group definition. Salisbury (1975), in referring to the work of Bentley, Latham, and others, states that the "idea of a group in these works is essentially an analytic construct used to order and interpret observed phenomena and not necessarily identical with what the real world would identify as interest groups" (p. 171). Given this ambiguity we cannot expect to have an agreed-upon definition of interest groups. In practice, the definition of interest group chosen should depend on the reason for studying them and should be delineated as such in the research being conducted.

HOW DO INTEREST GROUPS INFLUENCE POLICY?

With more groups and greater activity than ever, measures to influence policy have burgeoned at the state and federal levels (Cigler & Loomis, 1995; Rosenthal, 1993; Salisbury, 1990; Schlozman & Tierney, , 1986; Thomas & Hrebenar, 1990; Walker, 1991). However, more interest groups does not necessarily equate to greater influence by these groups (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, & Salisbury, 1993; Salisbury, 1990). Interest groups can wield considerable influence, and yet in other instances, they wield little or no influence over policy outcomes. As such, studying the influence of organized interests has shifted from asking whether interest groups exert influence to understanding when groups are likely to be influential (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Nownes, 2001). In this section, we present the current literature on how interest groups affect influence by focusing on the roles of context, lobbying, and the influential in this process.

Context Matters

An examination of the literature indicates a variety of environmental conditions that increase the likelihood of an interest group exerting influence (Nownes, 2001). Interest groups will have a high probability of affecting policy outcomes when they face little or no opposition from other policy actors or policy actors are undecided on an issue. Interest groups are also likely to be successful at influencing policy outcomes when an issue is highly technical or complex, nonpartisan and nonideological, or receives little public or media attention. Interestingly, the presence of many of these advantageous conditions is often associated with issue niches (Browne, 1990; Gray & Lowery, 1998), where groups successfully exert control over particular issues.

In contrast, the conditions that promote interest group influence are often absent from the environment when political elites are actively involved. As such, it comes as no surprise that Malen (2001) and others have concluded that political elites depress or even eclipse the influence of interest groups (e.g., Chance, 1986; Fuhrman, 1994; 2001; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1994; Gittell

& McKenna, 1999; Kirst & Carver, 1994; Kirst & Yee, 1994; Mazzoni, 1993; 1995, 2000; Wohlstetter, 1994; Young, Shepley, Miskel, & Song, 2002). What we do not yet fully comprehend in the literature is the direction of the association. That is, do the political elites advance some of these conditions to enhance their own influence, are political elites more likely to get involved when the conditions favor their influence, or is it some combination of both depending on the situation?

Additionally, Rosenthal's (1993) Third House, suggests that groups are more influential at the state level than in Washington. This state level influence is greatly affected by the diversity in political and institutional environments, which includes the power of the governor and legislature, political culture, socioeconomic development, and other conditions (Thomas & Hrebenar, 1990, 1992). A crowded political landscape and competitive politics also serve to limit the influence of any particular interest group (Heinz et al, 1993; Mazzoni, 1995, 2000; Salisbury, 1990). Simply, policy making occurs in a complex milieu, and analyzing the environment is key to understanding influence.

In light of the importance of contextual variables, several items need to be considered for future investigations of the influence of interest groups over educational policy. First, we need to expand the body of research to include a range of circumstances. Too often educational politics studies focus on issues that involve heightened media and public attention, multiple policy actors, and strong partisan or ideological discourse. In effect, our selection of educational issues creates a biased sampling. Indeed, research funding and strong public and governmental interest in our research are often attached to vogue issues or issues that appeal, fascinate, or stir the public and practitioners. Yet few issues generate such substantial hullabaloo and participation. Most educational issues, like the larger interest group universe (c.f., Baumgartner & Leech, 2001; Browne, 1990), involve one or a few groups and stay under the public and media radar. As such, our theoretical knowledge, and ultimately, practical counsel will wane should we not develop a more comprehensive representation of political circumstances that includes both attention-grabbing and monotonous topics. Furthermore, we need to expand our scope of states in which we study interest groups (Mazzoni, 1995). Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt (1989) found that the relative power and influence of policy actors engaged in educational policy making varied across states. If state-specific variables play an important role in interest groups' ability to affect policy, then we need to include more states in our study of educational politics and endeavor to conduct comparative studies. Moreover, international comparative study of groupñstate relationships, as it relates to educational politics, will also enlighten our understanding of the relationship between context and group influence.

Shifting the level of analysis might also provide different lenses for interpreting influence. For example, many state-level analyses commonly show the state teacher associations as being one of the more (if not the most) influential groups in the state (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1986; Thomas & Hrebenar, 1992). In contrast to teacher associations, many single-issue groups may exert considerable control over specific issues, but are estimated to be inconsequential at the state level more generally. The level of analysis in conjunction with environmental context may prove a reasonable explanation for the contradictions in the literature about the influence of groups. Future research also needs to investigate the similarities and differences in the relationship between contextual factors and group influence at the federal, state, and local level, and improve our efforts to understand vertical effects (i.e., national groups affecting state or local policy).

Longitudinal investigations may also provide needed understanding of the intersection of context and interest group influence. Issues are long-standing or tend to recur on the policy agenda (Browne, 1990; Laumann & Knoke, 1987; Salisbury et al., 1987). Reading, for example, has been addressed for over 100 years (Ravitch, 2000), and market-based initiatives have repeatedly

surfaced in various forms since the 1980s. Educational researchers should investigate shifts in group influence across time. Longitudinal analysis will advance our understanding of how influence of groups varies with changes in the environment. Ultimately, we need predictive models that include a variety of contextual factors that allow us to understand the relative impact of individual environmental factors on interest group influence

LOBBYING

Generally, the study of interest group lobbying delves into how groups attempt to affect government decision-making. Lobbying has been studied extensively, and the research consistently shows that at both the national and state levels, organized interests use a wide range of similar lobbying tactics (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Caldeira, Hojnacki, Wright, 2000; Heinz et. al 1993, Knoke, 1990; Kollman 1998; Nownes & Freeman, 1998; Rosenthal, 1993; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986). Education research suggests a similar pattern of interest group lobbying behavior (e.g., Karper & Boyd, 1988; Mazzoni & Malen, 1985; Opfer, 2001; Young & Miskel, 2004). Additionally, with more groups lobbying, and groups doing more lobbying, lobbying activity overall has dramatically increased (Cigler & Loomis & Cigler, 2002; Schlozman & Tierney, 1983, 1986). Although groups are engaging in "more of the same" in terms of lobbying activities (Schlozman & Tierney, 1983, 1986), there are a few important departures from past lobbying activities. First, "more of the same kind of activity" has become "something categorically different" (Cigler & Loomis, 1995, p. 393). Of particular note is the expansion of monitoring, PAC giving, and grassroots lobbying (Nownes & Freeman, 1998).

Second, lobbying is more sophisticated (Cigler & Loomis, 2002). Karper and Boyd (1988), for example, found that traditional educational interest groups used the same lobbying tactics they had always used, but lobbied with more professionalism, expertise, and knowledge. Interest groups primarily comprised of noneducators also skillfully, extensively, and effectively lobby to influence educational policy (e.g., Mazzoni & Clugston, 1987; Mazzoni & Malen, 1985). Interest groups have also increased the range of lobbying techniques (Mahood, 2000; Wright, 1996). For example, educational interest groups operating at the federal level heavily utilized tactics that provided groups with direct access to legislators (Opfer, 2001). However, after the 1994 election, interest groups expanded their use of grassroots mobilization and quasi-access tactics where members contacted congressional members and staff.

Third, lobbying largely involves generating, monitoring, and disseminating information (Cigler & Loomis, 2002). Contemporary educational policy making requires considerable knowledge about problems and alternatives, and interest groups offer policy makers expertise (Kaplan & Usdan, 1992). Conversely, interest groups seek information, and monitoring is a central activity of many interest groups (Salisbury, 1990). As Salisbury explains:

> Before [interest groups] can advocate a policy, they must determine what position they wish to embrace. Before they do this, they must find out not only what technical policy analysis can tell them but what relevant others, inside and outside the government, are thinking and planning. (pp. 225–226)

Interest groups also disseminate information to their memberships or interested publics to stimulate support and activity for their policy goals. This upsurge in information is largely due to technological advances that facilitate information gathering and dissemination. Computer-based technologies also facilitate the capability of organized interests to carry out other lobbying

activities as well, contributing to their ability to engage in a lobbying activity more often, use multiple lobby strategies, and lobby more efficiently and faster than decades past. Finally, interest groups have broadened their lobbying targets (Mahood, 2000). Because educational policy is multilevel (i.e., local, state, and national) and increasingly involves the participation of the state executive, legislative, and judicial branches, more access points are used to influence policy than ever before.

Many quantitative studies on the relationship between interest groups' lobbying tactics and influence indicate that lobbying increases a group's influence (e.g., Caldeira & Wright, 1998; Langbein, 1993; Langbein & Lotwis, 1990; Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, & Lehmann, 1993; Wright, 1990). Further, some lobbying activities are more likely to result in policy success than others: forming coalitions, seeking issue niches, engaging in an extensive lobbying offensive, contributing to electoral campaigns, and mobilizing the public (Nownes, 2001). However, several studies of PACs and direct lobbying have shown lobbying to be marginal or inconsequential (e.g., Grenzke, 1989; Rothenberg, 1992; Wright, 1990).

This lack of consensus in the literature on the effect of lobbying suggests that in the same way that context affects group influence, by and large and on specific issues, context impacts lobbying effectiveness. Smith's (1984) study of the influence of the NEA, for example, found that lobbying for the passage of a bill only marginally increased Congressional support; and lobbying efforts did not maintain support when the members proposed threatening amendments and motions. In another study, Smith (1993) found the NEA and AFT's influence depended on the proportion of their members who resided in the member's congressional district, the number of group members who lobbied members of Congress, campaign contributions to the member, and their endorsement of the member of Congress during the previous election. The policy environment plays an important role at the state level as well. For example, Young and Miskel (2004) concluded that variations in state environments may have accounted for why increases in the number of lobbying tactics used or increases in the extent to which a tactic was employed increased a policy actor's influence in some states but not others.

Though important strides have been made to advance our understanding of the relationship between lobbying and influence over educational policy outcomes, the study of lobbying tactics of educational interest groups remains woefully underdeveloped. To build our knowledge base about interest group lobbying, several items deserve consideration: context, relative comparisons, group range, and quantitative research. If interest groups respond to changes in the policy environment, then their lobbying strategies will certainly depend on the political context (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Browne, 1990; DeGregorio & Rossotti, 1995; Godwin, 1988). As such, we must expand our study of lobbying activity to include a variety of political situations (Young & Miskel, 2004). Further, most qualitative and quantitative studies explore lobbying efforts jointly (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). Given the limited resources, interest groups must discover which strategies are effective and under what conditions they are most effective. Research that attempts to rank the relative effectiveness of strategies will provide considerable practical insight to educational interest groups with limited fiscal and temporal resources. Next, much of the educational literature tends to focus on the same types of groups (i.e., teacher associations, business groups, and conservative groups). We need to expand the literature to include a wider range of group types, which in conjunction with context variation will allow us better to ascertain how groups select lobbying strategies, allowing educational researchers to contribute to the novel and burgeoning literature on choices of lobbying tactics (e.g., Caldeira et al. 2000; Tierney, 1994). Finally, the educational research on interest group lobbying is largely qualitative and generally limited in scope (i.e., investigates a single issue, one or only a few groups, or a single state) (Young & Miskel, 2004). Quantitative research will facilitate study of many groups across

multiple situations in an array of environments, possibly allowing us to develop generalizations about interest group lobbying in educational policy.

THE INFLUENTIAL

Businesses and traditional associations still tend to be the more influential groups (Lowery & Brasher, 2004; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986; Thomas & Hrebenar, 1999). Explanations for their preeminence are their long-standing “insider relations” with officials (Thomas & Hrebenar, 1999b, p. 33) and the resource advantage they enjoy (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001). It should not be presumed, however, that new groups exert little to no influence. In fact, new interest groups have been shown to be effective at the state level in influencing policy making (Allen, 2005). However, so dominant are the traditional interests, the influence of the new interests in comparison is “relatively light weight,” and their successes have been minor and infrequent (Thomas & Hrebenar 1991; 1996; 1999a), with only a few groups effective in a large number of states (Thomas & Hrebenar, 1996, 1999a).

A similar pattern of business group and traditional educational association dominance exists in the educational research literature as well (Mazzoni, 1995, 2000; Marshall et al., 1989; Thomas & Hrebenar, 1991, 1996, 1999a). Despite the increase in new group activity and the splintering of formidable alliances among some traditional education groups (Feir, 1995; Mazzoni, 1995, 2000), business groups and traditional educational associations retain their influential status (Thomas & Hrebrenar, 1991, 1996, 1999a). Corporate interest groups individually and in coalitions have participated in task forces, initiated partnerships with schools and school districts, formed coalitions with political elites, and funded policy research to influence policy (McGuire, 1989). As Mazzoni (1995, 2000) points out in his review of state educational policy making in the 1980s, scholars provide compelling evidence of the significance of business in state school policy (e.g., Berman & Clugson, 1988; Chance, 1986; Fuhrman, 1989; Massell & Fuhrman, 1994; Mazzoni & Clugston, 1987; Shipps, 1997; Sipple et al., 1997). However, business groups were not uniformly influential on K-12 issues across all states (Mazzoni, 1995, 2000).

Like business groups, teacher associations are also not uniformly influential, yet are still viewed as one of the more influential interest groups. In fact, many educational reform initiatives have been passed despite the resistance of teacher associations; and teacher associations are now considered reactive rather than proactive policy actors (Kirst, 1984; Mazzoni, 1995; 2000; McDonnell & Fuhrman, 1986). The growing involvement and influence of political elites likely accounts for the waxing influence of business groups (with whom they often partner) and for the waning influence of teacher associations (with which they often disagree), particularly on market-based initiatives, assessment, and accountability policies.

In recent decades, other groups have increasingly exerted influence over educational policy, most notably, conservative interest groups. Conservative groups have been extremely effective at altering educational policy throughout the country (Apple, 2001; Cibulka, 2001; Lugg, 2001; Wirt & Kirst, 1997). For example, they were successful at winning a court battle for tax-funded educational vouchers (Lugg, 2004), blocking implementation of comprehensive sexuality programs (Lugg, 2003; Vergari, 2000), and promoting phonics instruction in Utah (Osguthorpe, 2003). The role of conservative media, think tanks, and policy centers continues to grow as well, particularly in an information-driven policy environment. These groups generate and disseminate information that often informs all aspects of the policy process and further enhances the influence of these conservative groups.

In light of these developments in the literature, additional research that compares the activi-

ties and influence of traditional groups with nontraditional groups is needed (Gray & Lowery, 2002). Undoubtedly, business and traditional education groups do exert influence. However, their influence may be overstated because studies tend to focus on the very issues that are likely to draw their participation. Expanding our purview of groups and issues studied may show that new groups are vastly more influential than once believed, either on a single issue or collectively. Extending our measures of influence may also provide additional insight about group influence. McDaniel (2001) and Song and Miskel's (2005) utilization of a social network analysis measure, centrality and prestige, provide substantial new insights about what denotes influence in educational policy.

HOW HAVE INTEREST GROUPS EVOLVED?

Moving way from outmoded conceptions of iron triangles, scholars studying interest groups have begun examining the complex workings of policy subsystems—particularly the formation, alignment, and realignment of coalitions within and between those subsystems. Sabatier (1991) observes that "one of the conclusions emerging from the policy literature is that understanding the policy process requires looking at an intergovernmental policy community or subsystem" as the basic unit of study (p. 148). A policy subsystem is defined as "those actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue," including "actors at various levels of government, as well as journalists, researchers, and policy analysts" (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 179). Research on policy subsystems has become the dominant paradigm of interest group scholars, and a burgeoning literature has developed around it. An anthology of classic works in public policy by McCool (1995) devotes an entire section to policy subsystems. In this segment of this chapter, we examine the development of the advocacy coalition literature and the relationship between these coalitions and educational change.

Advocacy Coalitions

Varying degrees of consensus, conflict, cooperation, and competition exist within policy subsystems. Often, coalitions form within policy subsystems—each seeking to obtain desired benefits through changes in programs and policies. In an attempt to explicate the political dynamics of this process, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) developed a model of interest group interaction that they call the advocacy coalition framework. Within policy subsystems, interest groups—and the policies and programs they seek to promote—have well established belief systems that are relatively stable over time, much like models of political culture. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that policy change and learning can best be understood as the product of competition among interest groups within the constraints of a policy subsystem. They argue that

> policy change over time is a function of three sets of processes. The first concerns the interaction of competing *advocacy coalitions* within a policy subsystem. An advocacy coalition consists of actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budget, and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time. The second set of processes concerns *changes external to the subsystem* in socioeconomic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, and output from other subsystems that provide opportunities and obstacles to the competing coalitions. The third set involves the effects of *stable system parameters*—such as social structure and constitutional rules—on the constraints and resources of the various subsystem actors. (p. 5)

According to this model, networks of policy actors learn how best to play the political game to achieve their policy objectives. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith refer to this process as policy learning, which is different from organizational learning wherein policymakers, operating in organizations, utilize systemic learning processes to improve policies. Policy learning, as used by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, is really political learning—an altogether different process. Sabatier (1993) argues that "on the basis of perceptions of the adequacy of governmental decisions and the resultant impacts as well as new information arising from research processes and external dynamics, each advocacy coalition may revise its beliefs or alter its strategy" (p. 19). Thus, learning is conceptualized as the product of each actor's (or interest group's) success at achieving its intended policy objectives.

This approach offers several advantages to researchers studying the politics of education. Stewart (1991) argues that

> in looking at change in public policy, particularly over an extended period of time, the advocacy coalition approach brings some important elements more explicitly into the analysis than does the rational actions approach. In particular, the role of new information, ideas, or assumptions can be considered in ways other than just as rational actions within organizations. (p. 171)

Another advantage of this approach to understanding policy change is that advocacy coalition models incorporate a change component into the theory, freeing it from the static, status quo elements of previous theories. By focusing on changes external to the policy subsystem, such as changes in socioeconomic conditions, governing coalitions, and outputs from other subsystems, advocacy coalition models demonstrate how changes in the external environment affect the policy-making process.[2] Support for this model comes from studies of the dynamics of the legislative process. Hula (1999), notes that: "Organized interests fight their major battles today largely in coalitions" (p. 2). Sabatier (1988) found that policy change occurs via the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions. Baumgartner and Jones (1991) believe that the coalition-building component of the theory is essential for policy change and innovation.

Advocacy Coalitions and the Politics of Educational Change

A number of studies of the politics of educational change support advocacy coalition theory. In their review of major multiple-state case studies in education, Burlingame and Geske (1979) assert that "the politics of education at the state level is still a politics of interest groups" (p. 71). In her studies of policy change in Canadian education, Mawhinney (1993a, 1993b) found that "the Ontario educational policy community is tightly knit with well defined sets of assumptions and norms" (p. 412). This suggests that policy communities have a significant impact on the nature and direction of policy change. Many such communities exist within the school choice movement. For example, the Home School Legal Defense Association and the National Home Education Network have been instrumental in the drive to legalize home schooling throughout the United States. The success of this movement attests to the power of organized interests in shaping education policy at the state level.

Advocacy coalitions have emerged as powerful players in the educational policy arena. In his analysis of changes in state educational policy making over twenty years in Minnesota, Tim Mazzoni (1993) found that advocacy coalitions were a driving force behind the educational reform movement. Mazzoni argues that Minnesota's state school policy subsystem can be characterized as an advocacy coalition of innovative reformers, which contributed significantly to Minnesota's adoption of the nation's first charter school law in 1991. He observed that "linking together gov-

ernment, business, education, foundation, parent, and civic actors—and led by elected officials—this coalition became a potent force in setting forth a restructuring agenda and in influencing the policy system to adopt public school choice as the central element in that agenda" (p. 375). According to Mazzoni, Minnesota's advocacy coalitions

> have repeatedly squared off during the past decade over issues of school reform, with their struggle appearing to have been spawned by a fundamental cleavage over core beliefs, by stable structural features of the institutional setting, and by the impact of multiple changes in a turbulent external environment. (p. 377)

Mazzoni concludes that Sabatier's advocacy coalition model is a useful approach to understanding policy change in education and that it "appears to fit significant developments within Minnesota's education policy system" (p. 377).

The findings of Mazzoni's research are consistent with Feir's (1995) analysis of education policy making in Pennsylvania. Feir found that a coalition of business leaders, media, governors, and chief state school officers were actively engaged in educational reform, while traditional education interest groups played minor roles in the reforms of the 1980s. He notes that "the expansion of the conflict over education reform to include business, political, and media leaders, coupled with the substantial neutralization of education interest groups, provided opportunities for new actors to set the agenda" (p. 29). The Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA), the state's largest teacher's union and traditionally the most influential lobbying organization in the state, lost considerable power in the 1980s and 1990s when it opposed two popular Republican governors—Richard Thornburgh and Tom Ridge—leading to "a long period of isolation from the administration's policy discussions" (Feir, 1995, p. 28).

The existence and impact of advocacy coalitions are more prominent on some issues than others. For example, highly controversial issues such as vouchers or student reassignment that polarize the electorate tend to bring highly organized advocacy coalitions to the forefront of political battles, while on less controversial issues the prominence and visibility of such coalitions are less obvious. For example, in his research on political battles over charter schools and vouchers in Texas, Fusarelli (2003) found that interest groups coalesced into well-defined advocacy coalitions supporting and opposing vouchers. However, the wide bipartisan support for charter schools did not produce well-defined advocacy coalitions since the issue was much less controversial. Extending his research on school choice into Pennsylvania and Ohio, Fusarelli observed that although advocacy coalitions supporting school choice are usually portrayed as being highly unified, in reality significant differences exist, even among groups supporting vouchers. Some provoucher groups are strongly ideological and have an "all or nothing" attitude. Some groups support vouchers for everyone, regardless of income, and favor reimbursing parents who already send their children to private or parochial school—a wholly unrealistic policy, given the enormous expenditure such plans would require. Other groups and individuals are more pragmatic, willing to make political trade-offs to get a small-scale voucher plan targeted at poor families and their children through the legislature. The wide variety of choice plans that have been proposed in state legislatures throughout the country indicates the diverse interests and objectives of voucher supporters.

Fusarelli (2003) also found that cohesive advocacy coalitions are not as easy to maintain as early theorists predicted. Acknowledging the difficulty of keeping unity among a coalition of organizations with diverse interests, a leader of an advocacy coalition stated,

> you have a coalition of 25 diverse organizations [school boards, superintendents, teachers, etc.] and lots of those groups don't trust one another very much. All these groups that are in my

> coalition never worked together. I think it's the only one issue [opposition to vouchers] they could all agree on. (p. 84)

Echoing this viewpoint, a key committee staff member in the Texas Senate noted that the "public school lobby—a lot of those people don't normally agree about anything. I remember telling Senator Bivins during the session, 'Congratulations. You have managed to unite the entire school lobby which no one has ever been able to do'" (p. 86). However, in the case of more popular issues with wide bipartisan support, such as charter schools, advocacy coalitions fracture; for example, in Texas, nearly all members of the major antivoucher advocacy coalition, supported charter schools. Diverging from some previous research on advocacy coalitions in other policy areas such as water politics, communications policy, or airline deregulation (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), in education politics advocacy coalitions tend to be much more prevalent, cohesive, and visible (and thus more easily identifiable) when they operate as oppositional coalitions—coalitions opposed to significant educational change (such as vouchers, student reassignment, outcomes-based education, etc.).

Adding to this complexity of studying advocacy coalitions in education is that in many advocacy coalitions, significant disagreement and rivalries exist within coalitions, making it more difficult to sustain them (Bulman & Kirp, 1999; Morken & Formicola, 1999). For example, disagreements and differences among school choice coalitions are common throughout the fifty states, depending on their constituencies. In Michigan, religiously inspired groups such as the TEACH Michigan Education Fund compete with free-market motivated coalitions led by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy over the preferred type of school choice (Morken & Formicola, 1999). Voucher coalitions are diverse and often fragile—a finding that contradicts a major premise of advocacy coalition theory. Bulman and Kirp (1999) documented the deep divisions in the provoucher coalition in Milwaukee between market-oriented conservatives and equity-oriented minorities as the battle for vouchers raged throughout the 1990s.

Finally, relationships among key interest groups change over time. For example, during the 1970s, when teacher strikes and collective bargaining were contentious issues, teachers' unions, school board associations, and administrator groups (the traditional Education Establishment) often disagreed vehemently on key education policies. However, key issues during the 1980s and 1990s have brought these groups into a more collaborative, coalitional mode of operation "epitomized by the formation of a broad new coalition to protect and improve the state education funding levels" (Karper & Boyd, 1988, p. 28). Karper and Boyd observed that education coalitions became common in state politics in the 1980s and 1990s as coalitions formed around issues of school funding, teacher dismissal policies and certification requirements, and increased graduation requirements. The researchers quote a lobbyist in Pennsylvania who trenchantly observed, "The best lobbying is coalition lobbying where you agree to form alliances on issues that you can agree on and then you agree to disagree" (p. 44).

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

In this chapter, we have analyzed the evolution of interest groups and their important impact on the politics of education. However, we would like to suggest that the next wave of research and scholarship in this area should focus not on interest groups or advocacy coalitions per se, but rather on the emerging importance of individual policy entrepreneurs and the politics of personalism. Kingdon (1995) argues that changes in the composition of actors in policy subsystems,

coupled with changes in the external environment, often play a determinant role in opening up windows for policy entrepreneurs to initiate policy change. Following this vein of research, Mintrom (1997), Hess (2005, 2006), and other scholars have begun studying the emergence of individual policy entrepreneurs and their impact on politics and policy in education. In his research on school choice, Mintrom found that policy entrepreneurs such as Joe Nathan in Minnesota, Polly Williams in Wisconsin, and Paul DeWeese in Michigan "raise significantly the probability of legislative consideration and approval of school choice as a policy innovation" (p. 738). A tax credit initiative in Colorado and charter school legislation in California "both began as ballot initiatives and each was the brainchild of a businessman" (Morken & Formicola, 1999, p. 42). As Morken and Formicola observe, "What is new in school choice is the arrival of entrepreneurs—activists who are independent, freewheeling, sensitive to marketing issues, and able to move with lightening speed and chutzpah" (p. 43). In fact, much policy change in education, particularly educational reform, comes from outside the traditional educational policy-making subsystem (Reyes, Wagstaff, & Fusarelli, 1999).

Policy entrepreneurs possessing enough fiscal resources have been able to utilize the mass media (TV, Internet blogs, and talk radio) to get their message across to a much wider audience then ever before. A situation is thus created where these entrepreneurs are well known within the political and policy-making community. By utilizing the media, policy entrepreneurs are often also able to get their message across without working through large, diverse coalitions or organizations.[3] This change in strategy and tactics is similar to how political candidates for national office now operate. In the past, candidates for national office worked their way up through the system, paying their dues—from precinct captain to local or state office, and then working with the state and national party apparatus. Now, candidates with enough money and charisma can virtually bypass the system entirely and capture a major party's nomination (this is now common in gubernatorial races).

Policy entrepreneurs focus almost exclusively on single issues (be it vouchers, small schools, curriculum reform, abstinence education, student reassignment, etc.) rather then broad agendas; and the issues they passionately advocate are often intensely personal to them (Fusarelli, 2006; Lugg, 2004; Opfer, 2006). Policy entrepreneurs such as these: "want if they can to bring everything down to persons, personal experience, personal qualities and personal relationships. Anything else tends to strike [them] as 'abstract' and boring" (Culpit, 1999, p. 22). Personal beliefs become the standard by which political actors influence policy makers and also judge the decisions made.

This personalism can have serious implications for policy making and democracy in general. Fiorina (1999) argues that it "increasingly has put politics into the hands of unrepresentative participators ñ extreme voices in the larger political debate" (p. 409). These entrepreneurs also take positions on issues that the majority does not care about (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Still others have argued that the activism undertaken by individuals with personal motivations is usually short-lived and results in shifting public attention to issues (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985).

Coupled with the often personal nature of education and its conflicting values ("my kids, my money, my values, their future"), policy entrepreneurs have begun to bypass the traditional time-consuming routes of influence (such as joining groups, forming broad-based coalitions with multiple members); they avoid interorganizational conflict, and exert their impact more effectively through this emerging politics of personalism. We suggest that while interest groups and advocacy coalitions will continue to be important in shaping educational politics and policy making, scholars should give more careful attention and devote more research to policy entrepreneurs,

RT61112_C011.indd 209 3/26/2008 5:21:16 PM

the politics of personalism, and the impact of the Internet and blogs on education politics and reform.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed the state of the literature on interest groups and advocacy coalitions in educational politics, noted the range of progress and challenges in the theoretical, empirical, and methodological approaches being used, and discussed ways in which the literature could be made more effective. This review has clearly demonstrated that both interest groups and advocacy coalitions are key actors in the policy process, and contemporary educational politics cannot be fully understood without substantive knowledge about the role of these groups and organizations. This review also demonstrated that organized groups and coalitions are difficult to study because of the diversity in their organization, their activities, and their influence. This scope is further complicated by the intricate nature of political environments. As such, developing a knowledge base sufficient in breadth and depth from an accumulation of studies specific to the study of educational politics is a challenging undertaking. Consequently, we believe that we will have to continue to draw heavily upon the broader field of political science for more comprehensive views. Though the politics of education literature related to interest groups and advocacy coalitions remains small, we have a few prominent areas of advance that contribute to the broader study of interest groups, most notably, the attention to context and the interactions of coalitions, government officials and agencies, interest groups, and policy entrepreneurs. In brief, because educational studies tend to be smaller in scale (because we often attend to local and state level endeavors), we are able to gather more information about the political milieu and foster insider relationships with policy actors. These small scale studies permit rich descriptions which facilitate theory building about the relationship between context and the role, activity, and influence of interest groups and coalitions and their respective interactions with other types of policy actors. Undoubtedly, this review suggests that despite progress, we have more questions than answers about organized interests and advocacy coalitions in American education. The field remains woefully undertilled.

NOTES

1. Traditional systems theory incorporates such processes into the analytical framework (see Easton, 1965). As such, advocacy coalition models share elements of this approach. Much of the intellectual groundwork of advocacy coalition models rests upon traditional systems theory. However, systems theory is not really a testable or verifiable theory of policy change so much as a laundry list of factors affecting policy development and change.
2. Think tanks, particularly those representing conservative interests, have been instrumental in their role as policy entrepreneurs in disseminating their research and ideas to a mass audience, particularly through the media. Reports and analyses are specifically written with this target audience in mind, and the lack of required vetting (i.e., white papers and issue briefs as opposed to peer-reviewed journal articles), enables these policy entrepreneurs to get their findings disseminated much more quickly and informally to a wide audience (including to influential policy makers).
3. This list of scholars is not intended to be inclusive of all the powerful work done by feminists in the policy sciences. But it is important to note the dates for this work—all of this was going on yet submerged and unnoticed by politics of education.

REFERENCES

Allen, M. D. (2005). Laying down the law? Interest group influence on state adoption of animal cruelty felony laws. *The Policy Studies Journal, 33*(3), 443–457.

Apple, M. W. (2001). *Educating the "right" way: Markets, standards, God, and inequality.* New York: Routledge-Falmer.

Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1991). Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems. *Journal of Politics, 53*(4), 1044–1074.

Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (1998). *Basic interests.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (2001). Interest niches and policy bandwagons: Patterns of interest group involvement in national politics. *Journal of Politics*, *63*(4), 1191–1213.

Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. (1985). *Habits of the heart.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berman, P. & Clugston, R. (1988). A tale of two states: The business community and educational reform in California and Minnesota. In M. Levine & R. Trachtman (Eds.), *American business and the public schools* (pp. 121–149). New York: Teachers College Press.

Berry, J. M. (1984). *The interest group society*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Boghossian, N. (2006, July 6). UTLA cash raises questions about endorsements. *LA Daily News.* Los Angeles, CA. Accessed July 18, 2006 at: http://www.dailynews.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=4017037,.

Browne, W. P. (1990). Organized interests and their issue niches: A search for pluralism in a policy domain. *Journal of Politics, 52,* 477–509.

Bulman, R. C., & Kirp, D. L. (1999). The shifting politics of school choice. In S. D. Sugarman & F. R. Kemerer (Eds.), *School choice and social controversy* (pp. 36–67). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Burlingame, M., & Geske, T. G. (1979). State politics and education: An examination of selected multiple-state case studies. *Educational Administration Quarterly, 15*(2), 71.

Caldeira, G. A., Hojnacki, M., & Wright, J. R. (2000). The lobbying activities of organized interests in federal judicial nominations. *American Journal of Political Science*, *62*, 51–69.

Caldeira, G. A., & Wright, J. R. (1998). Lobbying for justice: Organized interests, Supreme Court nominations, and United States Senate. *American Journal of Political Science*, *42*(2), 499–523.

Center for Responsible Politics. (2006). *Lobbying overview*. Washington, DC. Accessed August 27, 2006 at: http://www.opensecrets.org/index.asp,.

Chance, W. (1986). *The best of educations: Reforming America's public schools in the 1980's.* Chicago: MacArthur Foundation.

Cibulka, J. (2001). The changing role of interest groups in education: Nationalization and the new politics of education productivity. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 12–40.

Cigler, A., & Loomis, B. A. (Eds). (1995). *Interest group politics: The changing nature of interest group politics* (4th ed). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Cistone, P. (Ed.) (1981). Educational policy-making: The major participants. Interest groups. Special issue of *Education and Urban Society*, *13*(2), 115–230.

Cupit, D. (1999). The new labour project: Modernization and personalism. *Political Theology*, *2*(1), 19–26.

DeGregorio, C., & Rossotti, J. E. (1995). Campaigning for the court: Interest group participation in the Bork and Thomas confirmation processes. In A.J. Cigler & B.A. Loomis (Eds.), *Interest group politics* (4th ed., pp. 215–238). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Dowagiac Daily News. (2006, August 21). [Editorial] Accountability needed, not mandated spending. *Dowagiac Daily News*. Dowagiac, Michigan. Accessed August 26, 2006. at: http://www.dowagiacnews.com/articles/2006/08/21/editorials/dneditorial01.txt,

Feir, R. E. (1995). *Political and social roots of education reform: A look at the states in the mid-1980s.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA.

Fiorina, M. (1999). Extreme voices: A dark side of civic engagement. In T. Skocpol & M. Fiorina (Eds.), *Civic engagement in American democracy* (pp. 395–426). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Fuhrman, S. H. (1989). State politics and education reform. In J. Hannaway & R. Crowson (Eds.), *The politics of reforming school administration* (pp. 61–75). Philadelphia: The Falmer Press.

Fuhrman, S. H. (1994). Legislatures and education policy. In S. H. Fuhrman & R. F. Elmore (Eds.), *The governance of curriculum* (pp. 30–35). Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

Fuhrman, S. H. (2001). Introduction. In S. H. Fuhrman (Ed.), *From the Capitol to the classroom: Standards-based reform in the states*: *The one-hundredth yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 2* (pp. 1–12). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fuhrman, S. H., & Elmore, R. F. (1994). Governors and education policy in the 1990s. In S. H. Fuhrman & R. F. Elmore (Eds.), *The governance of curriculum* (pp. 56–74). Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

Fusarelli, L. D. (1997). *What's to negotiate? Interaction in the absence of dialogue: The battle over vouchers and charter schools*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the University Council for Educational Administration. Orlando, FL. ERIC Document ED 414 654.

Fusarelli, L. D. (2003). *The political dynamics of school choice: Negotiating contested terrain*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fusarelli, L. D. (2006). Future research directions and policy implications for superintendent-school board relations. In G. J. Petersen & L. D. Fusarelli (Eds.), *The politics of leadership: Superintendents and school boards in changing times* (pp. 181–195). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.

Gittell, M., & McKenna, L. (1999). Redefining education regimes and reform. *Urban Education, 34*(3), 268–291.

Godwin, R. K. (1988). *One billion dollars of influence: The direct marketing of politics.* Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

Gray, V., & Lowery, D. (1998). To lobby alone or in a flock: Foraging behavior among organized interests. *American Politics Quarterly, 26*(1), 5–34.

Grenzke, J. (1989). PACs and the congressional supermarket: The currency is complex. *American Journal of Political Science, 33*, 1–24.

Heinz, J., Laumann, E., Nelson, R., & Salisbury, R. (1993). *The hollow core: Private interests in national policy making*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hess, F. M. (Ed.). (2005). *With the best of intentions: How philanthropy is reshaping K-12 education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.

Hess, F. M. (Ed.). (2006). *Educational entrepreneurship: Realities, challenges, possibilities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1969). *The idea of a party system: The rise of legitimate opposition in the United States, 1780–1840.* Berkeley, CA: University of California.

Hula, K. W. (1999). *Lobbying together: Interest group coalitions in legislative politics* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Sabatier, P. A. (1994). Evaluating the advocacy coalition framework. *Journal of Public Policy, 14*(2), 179.

Johnson, B. L., Jr. (2001). Micropolitical dynamics of education interests: A view from within. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 115–134.

Kaplan, G. R., & Usdan, M. D. (1992). The changing look of education's policy networks. *Phi Delta Kappan*, *73*(9), 664–672.

Karper, J. H., & Boyd, W. L. (1988). Interest groups and the changing environment of state educational policymaking: Developments in Pennsylvania. *Educational Administration Quarterly, 24*(1), 21–54.

Kingdon, J. W. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policy* (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.

Kirst, M. W. (1984). *Who controls our schools?* New York: Freeman.

Kirst, M. W., & Carver, R. (1994). School reform in Florida: A decade of change from 1983ñ1993. In D. Massell & S. Fuhrman (Eds.), *Ten years of state education reform, 1983–1993: Overview of four case*

studies (pp. 105–135). New Brunswick, NJ: Consortium for Policy Research in Education.

Kirst, M. W., & Somers, S. A. (1981). California educational interest groups: Collective action as a logical response to Proposition 13. *Education and Urban Society, 13* (2), 235–256.

Kirst, M. W., & Yee, G. (1994). An examination of the evolution of California state educational reform, 1983–1993. In D. Massell & S. Fuhrman (Eds.), *Ten years of state education reform, 1983–1993: Overview with four case studies* (pp. 67–103). New Brunswick, NJ: Consortium for Policy Research in Education.

Knoke, D. (1990). *Organizing for collective action: The political economies of organizations.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Kollman, K. (1998). *Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Langbein, L. (1993). PACs, lobbies, and political conflict: The case of gun control. *Public Choice, 75,* 254–271.

Langbein, L., & Lotwis, M. (1990). The political efficacy of lobbying and money: Gun control in the U.S. House, 1986. *Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15*, 413–440.

Laumann, E. O., & Knoke, D. (1987). *The organizational state: Social choice in national policy domains*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Loomis, B. A., & Cigler A. J. (2002). Introduction: The changing nature of interest group politics. In A. .J. Cigler & B. A. Loomis (Eds*.), Interest group politics* (6th ed) (pp. 1–33). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Lowery D., & Brasher, H. (2004). *Organized interests and American government*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lowi, T. (1979). *The end of liberalism: The second republic of the United States* (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.

Lugg, C. A. (2001). The Christian right: A cultivated collection of interest groups. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 41–57.

Lugg, C. A. (2003). Sissies, faggots, lezzies and dykes: Gender, sexual orientation and the new politics of education. *Educational Administration Quarterly, 39,* 95–134.

Lugg, C. A. (2004). One nation under God? Religion and the politics of education in a post-9/11 America. *Educational Policy, 18*(1), 169–187.

Macridis, R. (1961). Interest groups in comparative analysis. *Journal of Politics, 23*, 27–31.

Mahood, H. R. (1990). *Interest group politics in America: A new intensity.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Mahood, H. R. (2000). *Interest groups in American national politics: An overview*. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.

Malecki, E. S. (1976). Pressure groups. *Dictionary of American History*, Volume 5. New York: Scribner's, 400.

Malen, B. (2001). Generating interest in interest groups. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 168–186.

Marshall, C., Mitchell, D., & Wirt, F. M. (1989). *Culture and education policy*. Bristol, PA: Falmer Press.

Massell, D., & Fuhrman, S. (1994). *Ten years of state education reform, 1983–1993*. New Brunswick, NJ: Consortium for Policy Research in Education, Rutgers University.

Mawhinney, H. B. (1993). An advocacy coalition approach to change on Canadian education. In P. A. Sabatier & H. C. Jenkins-Smith (Eds.), *Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach* (pp. 59–82). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Mawhinney, H. B. (1993b). An interpretive framework for understanding the politics of policy change. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Ottawa.

Mawhinney, H. B. (2001). Theoretical approaches to understanding interest groups. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 187–214.

Mawhinney, H. B., & Lugg, C. A. (Eds.) (2001). Interest groups in United States Education. Special issue of *Educational Policy*, *15*(1), 3–217.

Mazzoni, T. L. (1993). The changing politics of state education policy making: A 20-year Minnesota perspective. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 15,* 357–379.

Mazzoni, T. L. (1995). State policymaking and school reform: influences and influentials. In J. D. Scribner & D. H. Layton. (Eds.), *The study of educational politics* (pp. 53–73). Washington, D.C.: Falmer Press.

Mazzoni, T. L. (2000). State politics and school reform: The first decade of the “education excellence” movement. In N. D. Theobald & B. Malen (Eds.), *Balancing local control and state responsibility for k-12 education* (pp. 147–196). Larchmont, NY: Eye on Education.

Mazzoni, T. L., & Clugston, R. M. (1987). Big business as a policy innovator in state school reform: A Minnesota case. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, *94*(4), 312–324.

Mazzoni, T. L., & Malen, B. (1985). Mobilizing constituency pressure to influence state education policy making. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, *21*(2), 91–116.

McCool, D. (Ed.). (1995). *Public policy theories, models, and concepts*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

McDaniel, J. E. (2001). *The shaping of national reading policy: Using a structural approach to examine the politics of reading.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan.

McDaniel, J. E., Sims, C., & Miskel, C. (2001). The national reading policy arena: Policy actors and perceived influence. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 92–114.

McDonnell, L., & Fuhrman, S. (1986). The political context of school reform. In V. Mueller & M. McKeown (Eds.), *The financial, legal and political aspects of state reform of elementary and secondary education* (pp. 43–64). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

McGuire, K. (1989). Business involvement in education in the 1990s. In D. E. Mitchell & M. E. Goertz (Eds.), *Politics of education association yearbook 1989: Education Politics for the New Century* (pp. 107–117). London: Taylor & Francis.

Mees, R. (2006, August 26). Candidates give views on dept. heads. *Hattiesburg American.* Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Accessed August 26, 2006 at: http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060824/NEWS01/608240311/1002,.

Mintrom, M. (1997). Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation. *American Journal of Political Science, 41*(3), 738.

Morken, H., & Formicola, J. R. (1999). *The politics of school choice*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Nownes, A. (2001). *Pressure and power: Organized interests in American politics.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Nownes, A., & Freeman, P. (1998). Interest group activities in the states. *Journal of Politics, 60,* 86–112

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Opfer, V. D. (2001). Beyond self-interest: Educational interest groups and congressional influence. *Educational Policy, 15*(1), 135–152.

Opfer, V. D. (2006). Personalization of interest groups and the resulting policy nonsense: The Cobb County school board’s evolution debate. In G. J. Petersen & L. D. Fusarelli (Eds.), *The politics of leadership: Superintendents and school boards in changing times* (pp. 73–93). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.

Osguthorpe, R. (2002). *Utah reading policy: Problems, processes, and participants* (CIERA Report). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for the Improvement of Early Reading Achievement.

Ravitch, D. (2000). *Left back: A century of failed school reforms.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Reyes, P., Wagstaff, L. H., & Fusarelli, L. D. (1999). Delta forces: The changing fabric of American society and education. In J. Murphy & K. Seashore Louis (Eds.), *Handbook of research on educational administration* (2nd ed., pp. 183–201). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Rothenberg, L. S. (1992). Interest group membership and organization: Multiple theories. In M. P. Petracca (Ed.), *The politics of interests*. (pp. 43–56). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Rosenthal, A. (1993). *The third house: Lobbyists and lobbying in the states*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein. *Policy Sciences, 21*, 129–168.

Sabatier, P. A. (1991). Toward better theories of the policy process. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 24*(2), 148.

Sabatier, P. A. (1993). Policy change over a decade or more. In P. A. Sabatier & H. C. Jenkins-Smith (Eds.), *Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach* (pp. 13–39). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (Eds.). (1993). *Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Salisbury, R. (1975). Interest groups. In F. Greenstein & N. Polsby, (Eds.), *Handbook of political science* (pp. 171–228). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Salisbury, R. H. (1990) The paradox of interest groups in Washington: More groups less clout. In A. King (Ed.), *The new American political system* (2nd ed., pp. 203–229). Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.

Schlozman, K. L., & Tierney, J. T. (1986). *Organized interests and American democracy.* New York: Harper & Row.

Salisbury, R. H., Heinz, J. P., Laumann, E. O., & Nelson R. L. (1987). Who works with whom? Interest group alliances and opposition. *American Political Science Review, 81,* 1217–1234.

Shipps, D. (1997). The invisible hand: Big business and Chicago school reform. *Teachers College Record, 99*(1), 73–116.

Sipple, J. W., Miskel, C., Matheney, T., & Kearney, C. (1997). The creation and development of an interest group: Life at the intersection of big business and education reform. *Educational Administration Quarterly, 33*(4), 440–473.

Skocpol, T., Abend-Wein, M., Howard, C., & Lehmann, S. G. (1993). Women's associations and the enactment of mothers pensions in the United States. *American Political Science Review, 87,* 686–701.

Smith, R. A. (1984). Advocacy, interpretation, and influence in the U.S. Congress. *American Political Science Review, 78,* 44–63.

Smith, R. A. (1993). Agreement, defection, and interest-group influence in the U.S. Congress. In W. H. Riker (Ed.), *Agenda formation* (pp. 183–207). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Smyth, J. C. (2006, August 25). Campaign launched to push early childhood initiatives. *Akron Beacon Journal.* Akron, Ohio. Accessed August 26, 2006 at: http://www.ohio.com/mld/beaconjournal/news/state/15361840.htm,

Song, M., & Miskel, C. G. (2002). Interest groups in national reading policy: Perceived influence and beliefs on teaching reading. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for the Improvement of Early Reading Achievement. ERIC Document ED 467 653.

Song, M. & Miskel, C.G. (2005). Who are the influentials? A cross-state social network analysis of the reading policy domain. *Educational Administration Quarterly, 41*(1), 7–48.

Sroufe, G. E. (1981). Interest groups and public policy: A status report. *Education and Urban Society, 13*(2), 149–171.

Steele, D. J. Jr., Working, R., & Biernacki, G. (1981). Care and feeding of interest groups: Interest groups as seen by a city school superintendent. *Education and Urban Society, 13*(2), 257–270.

Stewart, J. Jr. (1991). Policy models and equal educational opportunity. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 24*(2), 171.

Thomas, C. S., & Hrebenar, R. J. (1990). Interest groups in the states. In V. Gray, H. Jacob, & R. Albritton (Eds.), *Politics in the American states: A comparative analysis* (5th ed., pp. 123–158). Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Little, Brown Higher Education.

Thomas, C. S., & Hrebenar, R. J. (1991). Nationalization of interest groups and lobbying in the states. In A. J. Cigler & B. A. Loomis (Eds.), *Interest group politics* (3rd ed., pp. 63–80). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

Thomas, C. S., & Hrebenar, R. (1992). Changing patterns of interest group activity. In M. P. Petracca (Ed.), *The politics of interests: Interest groups transformed* (pp. 150–174). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Thomas, C. S., & Hrebenar, R. J. (1996). Interest groups in the states. In V. Gray & H. Jacob (Eds.), *Politics in the American states* (6th ed., pp. 122–158). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Thomas, C. S., & Hrebenar, R. J. (1999a). Interest groups in the states. In V. Gray, R. L. Hanson, & H. Jacob (Eds.), *Politics in the American states* (7th ed., pp. 113–143). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Thomas, C. S., & Hrebenar, R. J. (1999b) Who's got clout? Interest group power in the states. *State Legislatures, 25*(4), 30–34.

Tierney, J. (1994). Interest group research: Questions and approaches. In W. Crotty, M. A. Schwartz, & J. C. Green, (Eds.), *Representing interests and interest group representation* (pp. 37–45). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Toppo, G. (2006, July 10). Report: NEA pays opponents of No Child Left Behind law. USA Today. Washington, DC. Accessed July 18, 2006 at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-07-10-nea-no-child_x.htm,

Truman, D. (1958). *The governmental process*. New York: Knopf.

Verba, S., & Nie, N. (1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York: Harper & Row.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. (1995). *Voice and equality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vergari, S. (2000). Morality politics and educational policy: The abstinence-only sex education grant. *Educational Policy, 14*(2), 290–331.

Walker, J. L. (1991). *Mobilizing interest groups in America: Patrons, professions, and social movements.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Wilson, G. (1981). *Interest groups in the United States.* London: Oxford University Press.

Wirt, F., & Kirst, M. (2005). *The political dynamics of American education* (3rd ed.). Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.

Wirt, F., & Kirst, M. (1997). *The political dynamics of American education.* Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.

Wohlstetter, P. (1994). Georgia: Reform at the crossroads. In D. Massell & S. Fuhrman (Eds.), *Ten years of state education reform, 1983–1993: Overview with four case studies* (pp. 137–151). New Brunswick, NJ: Consortium for Policy Research in Education.

Wright, J. R. (1996). Contribution, lobbying and committee voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review, 84,* 417–438.

Yoho, J. (1998). The evolution of a better definition of "interest group" and its synonyms. *The Social Science Journal, 35*(2), 231–243.

Young, T. V., & Miskel, C. G. (2004, April). Interest groups' lobbying activities in state reading policy. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Diego, CA.

Young, T. V., Shepley, T. V., Miskel, C. G., & Song, M. (2002, December). Reading from the top: The role of governors in reading policy agenda setting. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Reading Conference, Miami, FL.